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tax notes federal
Notable Employee Benefits Articles of 2018
by Kathryn J. Kennedy and Melissa Travis
• the author must be a full-time law professor,
or, for a coauthored piece, the first-,
second-, or third-listed author must be a fulltime law professor;
• the article was published or expected to be
published during calendar 2018 or the
academic 2017-2018 term or forthcoming in
the 2018-2019 term; and
• the article must appear or be expected to
appear in a student-edited law journal or
student-edited law review (or faculty-andstudent-edited law journal or law review)
affiliated with an American Bar Associationaccredited law school or a Federation of Law
Societies of Canada-accredited law school.2

Kathryn J. Kennedy is a professor of law at
the John Marshall Law School in Chicago.
Melissa Travis is an employee benefits legal
consultant at Mercer LLC in Chicago. They
thank Raizel Liebler and Jessica Frothingham
for their assistance in compiling more than 70
employee benefits law review articles for
consideration.
In this article, Kennedy and Travis
summarize 10 noteworthy law review articles
published in 2018.
Copyright 2019 Kathryn J. Kennedy and
Melissa Travis.
All rights reserved.
I. Introduction
This is the ninth year Tax Notes has extended
an invitation to write an article summarizing the
10 law review articles that employee benefits
scholars and practitioners should have read (but
1
possibly didn’t) in 2018. In recent years,
healthcare reform and executive compensation
have dominated the field of employee benefits
law. However, we continue to see a renewed
interest in scholarship regarding retirement plans,
especially in the areas of state IRA initiatives and
public pension plans. The bulk of the scholarship
produced last year focused on retirement and
welfare plans. This trend will undoubtedly
change during 2019 as Congress continues to
dabble in healthcare reform and retirement
benefit issues.
II. Criteria

Those criteria excluded several excellent
articles written by practitioners, as well as
academics who published in practitioner journals.
The exercise of reading all the 2018 published
law review articles on employee benefits law was
daunting, but refreshing. Excellent scholarship is
being written in this area of law; it will assist the
courts, the regulators, and the bar alike, especially
because new legislation will be enacted affecting
employee benefits. It was refreshing to see so
many students’ comments and notes on employee
benefits issues as more law schools are adding
3
employee benefits to their curricula.
As Kathryn J. Kennedy is one of the faculty
advisers to The John Marshall Law Review, she reads
all the notes and comments published in the law
review over a given academic year and
recommends a single piece to nominate for the
national Scribe’s award. The task for this article

The pool of law review articles to be
considered had to satisfy the following criteria:
2

1

Bridget J. Crawford began this tradition in 2009 with her article
“Law Review Articles You Should’ve Read (but Probably Didn’t) in
2009,” Tax Notes, Jan. 18, 2010, p. 397, relating to estate planning issues.

Kathryn J. Kennedy’s articles published in 2018 were excluded from
consideration.
3

The John Marshall Law School in Chicago continues to provide the
only LL.M. and M.J. in Employee Benefits degree in the nation.
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was not much different; it just involved slightly
different criteria for evaluation.
With more than 70 articles under
consideration, our criteria were diverse:
• Did the article force us to think about a
given area of employee benefits law in a
novel way?
• Did the author undertake a difficult topic,
and if so, did the author provide us with the
necessary background information to
understand the topic? Were original ideas
posed?
• Did it rely on legal analysis as opposed to
policy arguments to suggest new proposals?
• Did it use empirical data to decipher
whether the law was accomplishing its
objectives, and if not, did the author
recommend alternative solutions?
• Did it provide us with a historical
perspective, if necessary, to ascertain how
the law was evolving?
• Was it clear and persuasive in its
recommendations?
• Did it provide a meaningful contribution to
academic scholarship?
While not all these factors were present in
every article, we used them to gauge how creative
and substantive an author’s proposals would be
for legal scholarship. We may not have agreed
with all the authors’ conclusions, but we felt their
approaches to be innovative and thought
provoking. The following is not a list of what we
perceive as the 10 best employee benefits law
review articles of 2018, but rather a list of what we
consider the 10 most noteworthy law review
articles on employee benefits law published in
2018 that a broad audience of employee benefits
scholars and professionals would find relevant
and worthy of significant attention.
III. The Chosen Ones
While it is typical to review the articles
alphabetically by the first author’s last name, we
changed tradition a few years ago and began
categorizing the articles into three areas:
retirement plan issues; healthcare reform and
welfare plan issues; and executive compensation
issues.

1830

A. Retirement Plan Issues
1. Benjamin P. Edwards, “The Rise of
Automated Investment Advice: Can RoboAdvisors Rescue the Retail Market?” 93 ChiKent L. Rev. 97 (2018).
Edwards addresses the issue of new
technology used to offer automated investment
advice (referred to as robo-advisers). Honest
Dollar, a start-up company, made employee
retirement plans accessible to small and earlystage businesses beginning in 2015. It embraced
the use of robo-advisers in its platform of low-cost
passive funds by offering investment advice
through its digital platforms. By completing
surveys regarding a participant’s investment
strategies and financial wellbeing, the automated
system devised a personalized portfolio for the
participant investor.
Since the company’s adoption of roboadvisers in 2015, the market for those services
continues to grow, with one source estimating the
use of automated investment advisers for $2
trillion in assets by 2020. This article examines the
potential market disruption that automated
investment advisers face, as well as the challenges
and barriers that lie ahead. Edwards begins with a
discussion of the current conflicted-advice
phenomenon that dominates the retail market,
which relies primarily on shares in funds. It is the
institutional intermediaries that market those
funds. In Edwards’s view, this market and the
institutional intermediaries have contributed to a
retirement crisis. It is estimated that a third of
Americans have no retirement savings, and those
that do have less than $10,000 in savings. For
those who save, most do not rely on advice from
financial professionals. This may be because
many financial advisers are compensated by
commissions, which direct investors into high-fee
products, and do not have sufficient incentives to
provide financial counseling and planning
services. Hence, the retail investment market has
a void that automated investment advice firms
could fill to alleviate the conflicted-advice
problem and expand investment advice to many
more participants because of lower costs. These
robo-advisers could have the added advantage of
forcing institutional intermediaries to steer
investors toward passive investment strategies.
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Edwards then examines the regulatory control
over advice-givers in the retail market, in which
their duties vary by the type of product marketed,
the type of compensation received, the source of
the investor’s funds, and other considerations. For
commission-compensated brokers, they are held
to the suitability standard under the Financial
Industry Regulatory Authority rules, which is not
a client best interest standard. Investment
advisers registered under the Investment
Advisers Act of 1940 are held to a client best
interest standard. And lastly, insurance brokers
that are regulated under a wide array of state laws
have no uniform standard of care.
Finally, Edwards discusses both the potentials
and pitfalls of robo-advisers. Robo-advisers have
the potential to alter the retail market by forcing
down costs on asset allocation advice. This will
have the benefit of having institutional
intermediaries steer investors away from
underperforming actively managed funds. That
in turn will make additional capital available for
investors to invest. But the perils facing roboadvisers include new cybersecurity risks as well
as changing regulatory standards. The
Department of Labor introduced its new fiduciary
standards for advice regarding retirement
accounts, only to be told to rethink that rule under
a presidential order. The SEC is also asking for
comments on the standards of care for investment
advisers and brokerage firms. Finally, roboadvisers face conflict of interest issues: If they
direct large amounts of capital to themselves, Wall
Street firms may be encouraged to change
algorithms used to allocate funds.
2. Anita K. Krug, “Investors’ Paradox,” 43 Iowa
J. Corp. L. 245 (2018).
In the first scholarship article to address the
topic, Krug examines a growth of new funds
(referred to as alternative funds) that attempt to
close the gap between retail investors and private
and more sophisticated investors. Krug examines
the set of factors that make up alternative funds
and evaluates their potential for retail investors.
She then critiques the SEC’s regulatory tool for
protecting investors — that is, disclosure — and
concludes that it is ineffective for these types of
investment. Thus, she says the regulators should
focus on the processes by which these mutual
fund shares are marketed and sold to investors.

This new investment of alternative funds (also
referred to as liquid alternative funds) replicates a
mutual fund that uses investment and trading
strategies typically found in hedge funds, private
equity funds, and other types of privately offered
funds. Because these strategies go well beyond the
strategies seen in publicly traded securities, they
are referred to as alternative strategies. The
statute that regulates mutual funds is the
Investment Company Act of 1940, which requires
mutual funds to accept investor redemptions
daily and to pay any proceeds from a redemption
immediately, giving rise to the “liquid”
component of these funds. These liquid
alternative funds allow investors to take
investment and trading positions that were
previously available only to private and more
sophisticated investors (for example, commodity
futures, swaps, options, and derivatives).
Another new product seen in the marketplace
is a subset of liquid alternative funds — that is, the
multi-manager series trust. These trusts have
sprung out of changes in the private fund market
that have allowed investment advisers who
manage private funds to move into the retail
space. While the cost of previously sponsoring
such funds had been prohibitive, the series trust
answers the cost problem by changing the
traditional model in which the investment adviser
of the mutual funds (that is, the fund’s manager)
sponsors the funds it manages, to one in which a
third party serves as the sponsor. The third party
creates each fund, registers it under securities
laws, and bears much of the expense that the
previously manager-as-sponsor would accept.
This series trust permits the manager to
accomplish efficiencies that would exist if each
fund were managed as a stand-alone mutual
fund. But the complexity of these investments and
trading activities demand sophisticated investor
knowledge.
These alternative funds present an investor
paradox: The usual standard is to minimize
investment risk by diversification of one’s
portfolio, whereas these new alternative funds
allow greater diversification but may undertake
unduly increased investment risk. To solve this
tension, Krug examines the existing regulatory
tool of disclosure and concludes that it is
ineffective. She focuses instead on reforming the
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mutual fund distribution process, which should
focus on a standard of fiduciary advice. Such
advice should obligate a financial adviser to
notify the investor about the appropriateness of a
mutual fund and whether the mutual fund results
in diversification of the investor’s investment
portfolio. In light of this standard, Krug discusses
the Department of Labor’s proposed fiduciary
standards applicable to brokerage firms and their
representatives.
Krug notes that the retirement plan channel as
a possible venue for marketing the alternative
funds may not be suitable because such funds
offered via a retirement plan are regulated by
securities laws and ERISA. Given that most
defined contribution provide for “self-direction”
of the investments by the plan participants,
participants may not be in a position to evaluate
the suitability of using alternative funds, nor are
they typically provided advice from a financial
professional because of the co-liability an
employer sponsor would assume in selecting such
professional. Thus, there may have to be other
distribution channels to market these alternative
funds. Krug concludes that the future of these
alternative funds will require greater education
by retail investors about the risk and reward of
such funds, including how they relate to the
diversification of the investor’s overall portfolio.
3. Kathryn L. Moore, “State Automatic
Enrollment IRAs After the Trump Election:
Are They Preempted by ERISA?” U. Ill. Elder L.
J. (coming 2019).
As states begin to close the gap between
saving for retirement and the lack of employer
retirement plans, especially for small and
medium-size employers, they have been enacting
legislation to mandate that employers that do not
sponsor plans automatically enroll their
employees in a state-administered IRA plan. The
article examines the legal challenges for such
plans, namely ERISA’s preemption clause. Section
4(a) of ERISA defines what is an “employee
benefit plan” for purposes of the law, and section
514(a) of ERISA preempts “any and all State laws
insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any
employee benefit plan.” So Moore addresses two
central issues: whether the state automatic
enrollment IRA plans are employee benefit plans
for purposes of ERISA, and if so, whether they are
1832

preempted by ERISA. And alternatively, if such
plans are not employee benefit plans under
ERISA, whether they are still preempted by
ERISA.
To answer those issues, Moore begins with a
straightforward overview and comparison of the
state automatic enrollment IRA programs —
namely, the initiatives offered in five states:
California, Connecticut, Illinois, Maryland, and
Oregon. She then moves to the Department of
Labor’s 2016 regulations that provided that state
automatic enrollment IRAs would not constitute
employee benefit plans under ERISA if they
satisfied 11 separate requirements, thereby
creating a safe harbor. Shortly after Trump’s
election, Congress passed resolutions
disapproving of the safe harbor, which caused the
Department of Labor to remove the regulations —
hence why Moore named her article accordingly.
The removal of the regulations clearly left open
the issue of whether state automatic enrollment
IRAs were covered under ERISA. In the absence
of regulations, Moore discusses whether such
state plans are covered under ERISA under prior
Department of Labor guidance, and if such state
plans are not ERISA plans, whether they
nevertheless relate to employee benefit plans such
that ERISA’s preemption clause would negate
them. The latter analysis also applies to whether
such state plans are said to be ERISA plans.
Finally, Moore considers the merits of the two
legal complaints that have challenged the state
laws. Given the timeliness of this article, it is one
that all benefits attorneys should read because the
courts will be making legal determinations
regarding the various state initiatives.
4. Paul Rose, “Public Wealth Maximization: A
New Framework for Fiduciary Duties in Public
Funds,” 18 U. Ill. L. Rev. 892 (2018).
Rose questions the application of the standard
fiduciary duties that public pension funds should
be managed solely for the benefit of plan
participants and beneficiaries. By viewing the
public and current and future taxpayers, not the
plan participants and beneficiaries, as the true risk
bearers of public pension funds, the fiduciary
duties owed by public pension fund trustees
should be altered. This will have important
consequences for the investment policies of these
funds.
TAX NOTES FEDERAL, JUNE 17, 2019
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Rose advocates a change in the fiduciary
duties for public pension trustees to embrace a
public wealth maximization framework. While
trustees of private pension funds generally focus
on “participant wealth maximization,” which
looks to the most favorable rate of return on their
investments, a public wealth maximization
standard would allow public pension trustees to
consider socially responsible investment
initiatives that benefit the public, who will be the
true recipients of the investment choices of the
public fund trustees. This new framework would
allow fund managers to take into account fully the
externalities that accompany these investments,
which in turn will assist them in fully and
accurately pricing these investments.
Rose makes his case for a change in the
fiduciary standards for public pension trustees in
four parts of his article. First, he examines the
existing fiduciary standards applicable to private
pension funds under ERISA and how the public
pension funds are influenced by those standards
even though ERISA does not apply to them. He
then questions the application of those trust-lawderived standards — developed under common
law, ERISA, or trust law — to public pension
funds. The reason for this is that public pension
funds have much different claimants and
liabilities than private pension funds. Given the
differences, Rose examines how shifting the
fiduciary duties to the true risk bearers of public
pension funds — the public — should change
how these pension funds invest. By broadening
the fiduciary standards for pension funds, the
trustees will have a wider range of investments to
choose from and will be able to focus on
sustainable, long-term projects for the public
good, rather than a short-term rate of return on
the investments. He concludes by stating that by
shifting the fiduciary duties to public wealth
maximization, public pension trustees will be able
to fully consider the externalities that accompany
their investments because it is the public that
funds the government who will be absorbing the
costs of these externalities. By allowing these
trustees to take positive externalities into account
in their investment decisions, they will be able to
invest in more sustainable enterprises and longterm projects.

B. Healthcare Reform, Welfare Plan Issues
1. John Aloysius Cogan Jr., “Does Small Group
Health Insurance Deliver Group Benefits?” 93
Wash. L. Rev. 1121 (2018).
While other scholarship exists discussing the
decline of the small group market, little
scholarship makes such a direct recommendation
to kill the market because of its continued decline.
However, this is exactly what Cogan argues in this
article. Cogan begins his argument with basic
facts — less than 30 percent of small employers
(that is, those employing fifty or fewer employees)
offer health insurance to their employees, and the
number of people covered by small group
insurance continues to drop. In lieu of stabilizing
the market via reform or regulatory efforts, Cogan
questions whether it is worth saving at all,
focusing on whether the small group market is
delivering group insurance benefits. That is, is it
offering insured individuals a better deal through
the available group health plan coverage than
would be available on an individual basis? To
Cogan, the small group market is not achieving
this goal.
As expected, his article takes issue with
further intervention in the small group insurance
market. It first provides a history of group
insurance, noting that this insurance traditionally
provides four core benefits: (1) reduced adverse
selection; (2) lower administrative costs; (3)
greater access to insurance; and (4) tax-subsidized
premiums. Based on a review of these core
benefits, Cogan posits that such advantages are
not being provided and that the small group
market generally offers no better deal than the
individual market.
He draws two additional conclusions from
such a review. First, because of size and the
actuarial limits of experience rating, small groups
are unable to be priced or administered in the
same way as large groups. Inevitably, this leads to
small groups being exposed to adverse selection
not unlike that experienced in the individual
insurance market. Second, and coupled with the
existing problem of adverse selection, because the
Affordable Care Act actively worked to improve
benefits within the individual market, it further
marginalized any benefit that could be brought by
selecting the small group market over the
individual market. In recognition of these
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conclusions, Cogan argues that allowing for the
demise of the small group market could simply
result in more participants moving to the
individual market, which would help the
individual market with little to no detriment to
individual plan participants.
With a push by the current administration to
encourage more flexibility in individualized
healthcare — for example, although recent Health
Reimbursement Arrangement proposed
regulations — and in making the large group
market incentives available to smaller groups —
that is, through the administration’s push to
expand Association Health Plans — there is
support for the argument that the small market
has lost its footing and will only continue to
decline naturally. Attempts to dismantle the ACA
may affect the arguments raised, but even with
concerns about the future of the ACA, a shift of
millions to the individual market would serve as
a reason to encourage its stabilization. For those
reasons, Cogan’s approach here, raising the
question “whether small group markets are doing
what they are aimed to do, and if not, why
continue them,” is certainly worth considering.
2. Wendy Netter Epstein, “The Health Insurer
Nudge,” 91 S. Cal. L. Rev. 595 (2017).
Epstein’s article focuses on the reality of rising
healthcare costs and suggests a fairly
straightforward approach to addressing these
issues. By no means has this subject been
overlooked in healthcare law scholarship. In fact,
much scholarly attention has been paid to how
patients and providers contribute to increased
healthcare costs, including scholarship by Epstein
herself; however, payors’ role in contributing to
the problem is underexplored.
Epstein argues that lawmakers are looking for
ACA savings in the wrong place. Common
recommendations — for example, removing sick
people from risk pools, reducing health plan
benefits — are not the answer because they would
effectively harm vulnerable patients. To that end,
Epstein recommends more action on the payor
side, arguing that they should “nudge” providers
away from needless expenditures by requiring
electronic alerts intended to deter unnecessary
care.
Epstein had written another article (“Nudging
Patient Decision-Making,” 92 Wash. L. Rev. 1255
1834

(2017)) focusing on a similar “nudge” intended to
affect patient decision-making. While reasonable
to encourage more patient autonomy and help
patients recognize the viability of any suggested
treatment, this subsequent article recognizes that
putting the onus on the payors instead may
ultimately better affect patients’ decision-making
because of the impact that such nudges may have
on the providers. This is in part because of
Epstein’s recognition of the importance of both
patient and physician autonomy in making
medical decisions. Also, this focus on provider
behavior recognizes that high-tech imaging and
laboratory tests are often overused. Absent any
sort of “nudge” on the providers, most patients
will assume that any recommendations by their
doctors are necessary.
Here, Epstein proposes a nudge on the
providers that instead protects the autonomy of
doctors and patients and steers decision-makers
toward appropriate, less-costly care. The nudge
recommended is fairly straightforward: It could
be communicated as a computerized nudge in the
form of an automated warning before a
physician’s order for a commonly used
intervention is submitted. Such a nudge would
have to be federally mandated, because otherwise
intervening factors — that is, market failures,
contract negotiations, and industry norms —
would likely dictate the omission of such nudges.
These electronic nudges would notify doctors of
the possibility of unneeded or overly expensive
care before recommending it.
Presumably, there will be pushback on such
recommendations, but those best suited to
address the costs are not the patients and
providers by themselves; the insurer
implementing a nudge may take a less politically
problematic approach than outright refusing to
reimburse for care post hoc. The nudge, via an
electronic warning, could respect both patient and
physician autonomy while also managing to curb
unnecessary care. While no empirical evidence
exists to support such a proposition, the mere
suggestion warrants further consideration. And
to the extent that nudges can be supported by
empirical evidence, such a nudge without any
sort of intervening law would be ineffective; thus,
a mandate for a provider nudge would have to be
required to give the policy any force.
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3 and 4. Abbe R. Gluck and Nicole Huberfeld,
“What Is Federalism in Healthcare For?” 70
Stan. L. Rev. 1689 (2018); and Gluck and
Huberfeld, “The New Health Care Federalism
on the Ground,” 15 Ind. Health L. Rev. 1 (2018).
In an impressive undertaking, Gluck and
Huberfeld performed a five-year study in which
they reviewed how federalism has affected the
ACA’s implementation, namely to see how states
and the federal government were sharing power
in putting the law into place through Medicaid
expansion and health insurance exchanges. This
study culminated in two articles published this
past year — one that focused on the findings, and
one that focused on the interviews the authors
conducted with about 20 high-ranking former
federal and state officials who were heavily
involved with the early years’ implementation of
the ACA. Because such important information
stemmed from the interviews, it seemed
inadequate to highlight the Stanford Law Review
article alone.
These articles tracked the details of the ACA’s
federalism, focusing on progress from 2012 to
2017. Given the pure scale of the ACA, Gluck and
Huberfeld saw the opportunity to investigate
federalism-related implementation from the
ground level and provide the concrete detail often
wanting in federalism scholarship. Key questions
motivating the project were: Does the ACA
actually effectuate “federalism,” and what are
federalism’s key attributes when entwined with
national statutory implementation? More directly,
the pieces discuss exactly what the title of the
Stanford article posits — that is, the purpose of
federalism within the ACA, because the
interviewees unanimously concluded that
federalism was the focal point of its
implementation — as well as the consequences
inherent in being unable to quantify this question.
While the results of this study were vast, some
of the more interesting findings by Gluck and
Huberfeld were that common theories in both
federalism and healthcare were not supported by
the study. While common conceptions of
federalism exist, posited by a broad spectrum of
theorists, those most commonly attributable to
federalism — for example, autonomy,
cooperation, experimentation, and variation —
have been generated in ACA implementation

across almost every kind of governance model.
What this means is that whether there was state
expansion of Medicaid, state-run exchanges,
federally run state exchanges, or the
implementation of a state innovation waiver
4
(established through section 1332 of the ACA),
these attributes of federalism were seen. Those
results, Gluck and Huberfeld argue, make it
increasingly difficult to point to a specific
implementation design and determine one to be
the most “federalist.” Such a determination
directly challenges the argument that federalism
goals can only be achieved through specific statefederal structural models.
Moreover, Gluck and Huberfeld’s study
questions how we can know if healthcare
federalism is best meeting its ends with a lack of
clear consensus as to the end goals for U.S.
healthcare in and of itself. Whether the goals are
policy or structurally focused directly affect
which ACA implementation arrangements best
effectuate those goals. That illustrates that
traditional expectations of federalism simply do
not reveal themselves in this study of the ACA to
the extent anticipated — that is, while there may
be more support that federalism preserves state
power in ACA implementation, the question
whether federalism has achieved good health
policy outcomes has been left unresolved. And to
the extent that good health policy may not have
been achieved, the lingering question remains
whether federalism and the need to advance and
preserve state powers was really necessary if the
ends fail to justify the means.
These articles illustrate that there exists no
bright-line determination on whether federalism
is the right choice for healthcare policy. ACA
implementation effectively illustrates that
measuring federalism was not quantifiable
despite five years of detailed study. The lack of
definitive answers opens the possibilities of what
federalism should mean in the future and raises
questions regarding what is best for healthcare in

4

See 42 U.S.C. section 18052 (allowing states to implement innovative
ways to provide access to quality healthcare — while waiving the needy
to comply with some ACA requirements — as long as the care is at least
as comprehensive and affordable as would be provided absent the
waiver, provides coverage to a comparable number of residents of the
state as would be provided coverage absent a waiver, and does not
increase the federal deficit).
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the United States in the future. Ultimately, these
articles by Gluck and Huberfeld provide excellent
scholarly contributions even beyond their value to
employee benefits scholarship.
5. Rachel E. Sachs, “Delinking
Reimbursement,” 102 Minn. L. Rev. 2307
(2018).
This article recognizes that prescription drug
costs are too high potentially because of the direct
“link” between government approval and
reimbursement. With existing proposed
legislation focused on finding different ways to
lower drug prices or, at a minimum, illustrate the
reason for such high costs — for example, the
Biologic Patent Transparency Act and the Drug
Price Transparency Act — there exists a
compelling interest in increasing drug price
transparency. Similarly, there have been other
approaches, focusing on curbing costs, from calls
for the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to
approve pharmaceuticals at a faster rate to giving
Medicare authority to negotiate drug prices. This
article notes the deficiencies in those approaches
alone, noting that a problem exists in doing so:
FDA approval and insurance reimbursement are
directly linked because insurers generally must
cover most FDA-approved drugs.
Sachs uses the article as an opportunity to
explain this linkage, arguing that understanding
the link between FDA approval and insurance
reimbursement is necessary in order to help
policymakers understand a possible system in
which the two can be delinked, at least in part.
Sachs discusses the implications for innovation
and access if approval and reimbursement were
delinked, including three potential consequences:
(1) reduction in access to these medicines, as
Medicare and Medicaid would no longer be
legally required to cover some drugs; (2) the
possibility for more innovation in offerings in the
event that these companies know that they must
earn not only FDA approval, but prescription
coverage; and (3) a direct way to address high
prescription costs attributable to (1) and (2) above.
Sachs also discusses other possible
consequences, as evidenced through some realworld examples of delinking (for example, the
Department of Veterans Affairs’ ability to
construct its own formularies, national payers in
European countries negotiating on behalf of
1836

citizens, and medical device approval in the
United States). From a review of these examples,
Sachs admits that while their facts illustrate some
effects of delinking (that is, decreased costs but
also lack of access), their review is more so to
proffer policy-based assessments from the impact
of delinking.
Finally, Sachs suggests several policy options
that would include some form of partial
delinking. While empirical analysis is needed,
Sachs’s suggestions recognize a need to consider
the possibilities of delinking if there is an interest
in curbing the costs of healthcare, and
prescriptions in particular. While this article’s
focus is more on healthcare law, its suggestion, if
enacted, would directly and greatly affect
employer-sponsored group health plans.
C. Executive Compensation Issues
1. Rebecca N. Morrow, “Noncompetes as Tax
Evasion,” 96 Wash. U. L. Rev. 265 (2018).
Morrow studied the use of noncompete
clauses typically found in executive
compensation agreements. These clauses create a
contract between an employer and an employee
such that the employee agrees not to work for a
competitor or enter into a competitive business
for a specified period following termination of
employment. Restricted periods are often 12, 18,
or 24 months after employment. Noncompete
clauses can be entered into before employment
commences with the employer, or while the
employee continues in the employer’s
employment, such as an induction to receive a
promotion or bonus. Their goal is to limit “the
5
post-employment mobility of an employee.”
Courts, federal policymakers, and state
legislatures have tried to limit the harm caused by
noncompete clauses, typically by relying on
contract law. Most states will enforce the
legitimacy of a noncompete based on its
reasonableness in duration, scope, and
geographic range. As the courts inevitably uphold
noncompete clauses if supported by adequate

5

Quoting from J.J. Prescott, Norman D. Bishara, and Evan Starr,
“Understanding Noncompetition Agreements: The 2014 Noncompete
Survey Project,” 2016 Mich. St. L. Rev. 369, 371 n.1 (2016); see also Bishara
and David Orozco, “Using the Resource-Based Theory to Determine
Covenant Not to Compete Legitimacy,” 87 Ind. L. J. 979, 986-987 (2012).
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consideration, attempts to curtail their use
through contract law have failed. In fact, a large
study of noncompete clauses demonstrates their
continued popularity regardless of the ability to
enforce them.
Thus, Morrow suggests a new and more
effective approach to curtail the use of
noncompete clauses: a tax-law-based approach.
When using a tax approach, a noncompete clause
is not simply a contract between the employer and
employee, it is also an intangible asset of the
employer because it promotes the employer’s
future market share and business prospects.
When viewed as an intangible asset that benefits
future years, starting when the employment
relationship ends, the payments for such an asset
should be capitalized over the determined useful
life, and not expensed over the employee’s
working years. However, employers routinely
violate this principle because they immediately
deduct the full amount of compensation as an
exchange for current wages.
Morrow recommends that the IRS change its
policy and view a noncompete as an intangible
asset that should be future valued and partially
expensed gradually over the restricted period that
begins after the employment relationship ends.
The IRS’s current policy prompts the continued
use of noncompete clauses by employers, while a
tax-law-based approach would curtail their use.
When employers take a current deduction for
wages subject to noncompete clauses, their
position in tax law does not coincide with the
position they are taking under contract law.
Under contract law, the compensation exchanged
for the noncompete clause forms the
consideration necessary to have a contract. But
this admits that such compensation is partially
consideration for the contract; the rest is
compensation in exchange for future benefits.
Hence, employers should not be allowed to fully
deduct compensation, but instead should value
the portion of the compensation that represents
future benefit and amortize that over the period
that begins when the employment relationship
ends. Hence the tax-law-based approach holds
6
“unique promise” to curtail the use of

noncompete clauses when the contract-law-based
approach has failed.
Morrow advocates a change in the IRS’s tax
policy because its current policy results in a
sizeable subsidy for employment noncompete
clauses. Such a change would provide another
“tool of resistance”7 for the continued use of those
clauses.





6

Morrow, “Noncompetes as Tax Evasion,” 96 Wash. U.L. Rev. 267, 273
(2018).

7

Id. at 325.

TAX NOTES FEDERAL, JUNE 17, 2019
For more Tax Notes Federal content, please visit www.taxnotes.com.

1837

© 2019 Tax Analysts. All rights reserved. Tax Analysts does not claim copyright in any public domain or third party content.

LAW REVIEW SUMMARIES

